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Exam 17: Oligopoly

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Question 181

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Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. 14. -Refer to Table 17-13. Suppose the owners of Lopes and HomeMax meet for a friendly game of golf one afternoon and happen to discuss a strategy to optimize growth related profit. If they both agree to cooperate on a strategy that maximizes their joint profits, annual profit will grow by

A) $1.0 million for Lopes and by $1.5 million for HomeMax.
B) $0.4 million for Lopes and by $3.4 million for HomeMax.
C) $3.2 million for Lopes and by $0.6 million for HomeMax.
D) $2.0 million for Lopes and by $2.5 million for HomeMax.

E) B) and D)
F) A) and D)

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Question 182

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Table 17-13 Two home-improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits of the two home-improvement stores are shown in the table below. 14. -Refer to Table 17-13. Increasing the size of its store and parking lot is a dominant strategy for

A) Lopes, but not for HomeMax.
B) HomeMax, but not for Lopes.
C) both stores.
D) neither store.

E) C) and D)
F) A) and C)

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Question 183

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We must be knowledgeable of how people behave in strategic situations if we are to understand

Table 17-30 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: -Refer to Table 17-30. Briefly explain why each duopolist earns a lower profit at the Nash equilibrium than if they cooperated to produce the monopoly output.

If a person can prove that she was damaged by an illegal arrangement to restrain trade, that person can sue and recover

If two players engaged in a prisoner's dilemma game are likely to repeat the game, they are more likely to cooperate than if they play the game only once.

The practice of tying is illegal on the grounds that

Table 17-35 Suppose that two coal mining companies - Allied and Barclay - own adjacent land suitable for excavating coal mines. The profits that each firm earns depends on both the number of mines it excavates and the number of mines excavated by the other firm. The table below lists each firm's individual profits: Allied Excavate one mine Excavate two mines -Refer to Table 17-35. Does Barclay have a dominant strategy? If so, describe it.

Table 17-5 The information in the table below shows the total demand for premium-channel digital cable TV subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each digital cable TV operator pays a fixed cost of $200,000 (per year) to provide premium digital channels in the market area and that the marginal cost of providing the premium channel service to a household is zero. -Refer to Table 17-5. Assume that there are two profit-maximizing digital cable TV companies operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of premium digital channel subscriptions to sell. How much profit will each firm earn when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium?

Table 17-8 For a certain small town, the table shows the demand schedule for water. Assume the marginal cost of supplying water is constant at $4 per bottle. -Refer to Table 17-8. If there were only one supplier of water, what would be the price and quantity?

Scenario 17-1. Assume that the countries of Irun and Urun are the only two producers of crude oil. Further assume that both countries have entered into an agreement to maintain certain production levels in order to maximize profits. In the world market for oil, the demand curve is downward sloping. -Refer to Scenario 17-1. The fact that both countries have colluded to earn higher profit shows their desire to keep their combined level of output

Compare the equilibrium output in a duopoly to the monopoly output.

Figure 17-4. Aaron and Ed are roommates. After a big snowstorm, their driveway needs to be shoveled. Each person has to decide whether to take part in shoveling the driveway. At the end of the day, either the driveway will be shoveled (if one or both roommates take part in shoveling) , or it will remain unshoveled (if neither roommate shovels) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows: -Refer to Figure 17-4. In pursuing his own self-interest, Ed will

Table 17-7 The information in the table below shows the total demand for internet radio subscriptions in a small urban market. Assume that each company that provides these subscriptions incurs an annual fixed cost of $20,000 (per year) and that the marginal cost of providing an additional subscription is always $16. -Refer to Table 17-7. Assume there are two profit-maximizing internet radio providers operating in this market. Further assume that they are not able to collude on the price and quantity of subscriptions to sell. How many subscriptions will be sold altogether when this market reaches a Nash equilibrium?

Suppose a market is initially perfectly competitive with many firms selling an identical product. Over time, however, suppose the merging of firms results in the market being served by only three or four firms selling this same product. As a result, we would expect

In the prisoners' dilemma game with Bonnie and Clyde as the players, the likely outcome is

In pursuing its own interest, an oligopoly firm will decide to increase production by 1 unit as long as

Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies. -Refer to Figure 17-5. The dominant strategy for ABC is to

Game theory is necessary to understand which kinds of markets? (i) perfectly competitive (ii) monopolistically competitive (iii) oligopoly (iv) duopoly (v) monopoly

Table 17-26 Two prescription drug manufacturers (Firm A and Firm B) are faced with lawsuits from states to recover the healthcare related expenses associated with side-effects from its drugs. Each drug manufacturer has evidence that indicates that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. State prosecutors do not have access to the same data used by drug manufacturers and thus will have difficulty recovering full costs without the help of at least one of the drug manufacturer's studies. Each firm has been presented with an opportunity to lower its liability in the suit if it cooperates with attorneys representing the states. Refer to Table 17-26. Pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will concede that taking their prescription drug causes liver failure e. only if Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. f. only if Firm B does not concede that taking its drug causes liver failure. g. regardless of whether Firm B concedes that taking its drug causes liver failure. h. None of the above. In pursuing its own best interests, Firm A will in no case concede that taking its prescription drug causes liver failure. ANSWER: d POINTS: 1 DIFFICULTY: Difficulty: Moderate LEARNING OBJECTIVES: ECON.MANK.15.84 - LO: 17-2 NATIONAL STANDARDS: United States - BUSPROG: Analytic TOPICS: DISC: Game Theory KEYWORDS: BLOOM'S: Application NOTES: r -Refer to Table 17-26. If both firms follow a dominant strategy, Firm B's profits (losses) will be